

Contestation and Local Control in Tanzania

Rachael McLellan

September 12, 2019

1 Introduction

Tanzania is one of the world's longest standing autocracies (Morse, 2018). It has been ruled by the same party, *Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)*¹ since independence in 1961. Until 1992, no other parties were allowed. Scholars characterize Tanzania as a highly successful example of the “tragic brilliance” of electoral autocracies: a regime not marred by significant violence but rather held together by incumbent hegemony over resources and opportunities (Diaz-Cayeros et al, 2003; Way, 2012; Morse, 2018).

The CCM dominates politics. They have never lost a presidential election. Opposition parties do win seats in the legislature and local and community governments but their share of these positions is dwarfed by the CCM's. After the founding election, opposition vote share actually fell over successive cycles and was split between several small parties. It therefore would be easy to dismiss opposition parties in Tanzania as a classic example of a co-opted, nonthreatening opposition.

However, opposition support has been building since 2005. With each electoral cycle, opposition parties increased their seats in the legislature and their control of local governments. Opposition parties won greater local control at each election. Importantly, legislative and local support coalesced around one main opposition party over this time, *Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (Chadema)*. For the first time, observers and analysts did not view the presidential election as a foregone conclusion in 2015. Opposition parties were not only seeking to replace the incumbent, they were getting threateningly close to doing so. Just three months before the October general election, the former CCM prime minister, Edward Lowassa, defected to the opposition and stood as their presidential candidate. Ultimately, the opposition coalition, *Ukawa*, lost the presidential election.² Opposition parties won forty percent of the presidential vote and forty five percent in the legislative vote. Since this election, opposition parties now control a significant number of local councils across country, empowered with local governance over around 25% of the Tanzanian population.

Over the same period, state violence has also been on the rise. As the CCM's hegemony over local state capacity has come under threat, the quiet coercive distributive bargain that has long held together the regime

¹CCM was formerly known as *Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)* before TANU joined with the Zanzibari *Afro-Shirazi Party* in 1977

²To this day, people are divided as to whether Lowassa's defection helped or hindered the opposition coalition.

has shifted. This is particularly true after 2015. The ruling CCM has been increasingly willing to resort to overt and covert state violence, politicized harassment by the courts and legal changes to narrow space for opposition (McLellan 2018; Paget, 2017).

In this dissertation I ask, what role local control has in this rise in opposition parties in Tanzania? I also ask how and to what extent local control precipitates this shift in incumbent strategies in this once peaceful country? To understand how the answers to these questions inform how we understand the politics of electoral autocracy more broadly, I situate Tanzania in the universe of cases I outline in Chapter 1 and account for my selection of Tanzania as my case.

1.1 Country case selection

My theory applies to decentralized electoral autocracies, especially low to middle income electoral autocracies with clientelist competition. Tanzania is a low-income electoral autocracy in East Africa. Parties compete for votes more on competence and distributive politics than ideological appeals.



Figure 1: Tanzania located on a map of Africa

Beyond these simple facts which I expand on below, the case of Tanzania has several useful qualities. First, politics in Tanzania is comparable to other low to middle income decentralized electoral autocracies, particularly post-socialist/post-communist countries with a legacy of one party rule. This is particularly true because politics

in Tanzania is not defined by ethnicity. While this limits the extent to which Tanzania is comparable with some other cases in sub-Saharan Africa, it increases the portability of the conclusions I draw to other regions.

Second, it is a case where we may not expect local politics to matter. Figure 2 shows Tanzania is not a highly decentralized country. It is below average on all forms (administrative, political, fiscal) of decentralization across all countries, average among all electoral autocracies.³ Many electoral autocracies, hybrid and single-party dominant regimes across Southeast Asia, the post-Soviet space, South Asia, Latin America are more decentralized than Tanzania. If I can show that local control matters in Tanzania, where the central government is relatively more powerful than in elsewhere in my universe of cases, this will provide convincing evidence for my theory and indicate that local control and indeed local politics more broadly matters more in electoral autocracies than scholars may ordinarily assume.




Figure 2: Levels of decentralization by country

Third, Tanzania is a least likely case of incumbent weakness and opposition strength given existing theories of regime durability. It is a case where it should be difficult for opposition parties to win votes. It does not have a significant history of opposition, CCM elites control much of the economy, civil society is weak and the opposition lack ethnic bases of support. Furthermore, the CCM regime itself should be highly durable. The CCM is a strong party with high organizational capacity. The party has hegemony over central state institutions as well as much of the economy and society. Existing theories cannot account for why a credible opposition has emerged in Tanzania or why the incumbent CCM has resorted to increasingly authoritarian tactics to contain it. If I can demonstrate that my variable of interest, local control, threatens regime durability and strengthens

³Tanzania is above average in sub-Saharan Africa. I do not seek to account for 'African politics' broadly

opposition prospects in a context where these dependent variables should be very high and very low respectively then it suggests that local control has a powerful effect on politics. Importantly, it suggests that local control is likely to be even more influential in countries where regime durability is less consolidated and where opposition parties have better prospects writ large. I go over my subnational case selection strategy in section 5 of this chapter. I now turn to my case background, first looking at the history of political competition and political parties in Tanzania.

2 Political Competition in Tanzania

Despite facing little competition for the vast majority of its reign, the CCM rules with certain pluralistic norms.⁴ Since the founding president *Mwalimu* Julius Nyerere stepped down in 1985, no President has served more than two five year terms and their successor has been selected by internal primaries. Around half of the population is Christian and the other half are Muslim. The Presidency and Vice Presidency alternate between Christians and Muslims. At any given time, the two executive positions are occupied by one Muslim and one Christian.

Tanzania is a multiethnic society but one where ethnicity is not politicized (Miguel, 2004). After independence, Nyerere declared Swahili as an official language and language of primary education. With each successive generation, Tanzanians identify less with their ethnic group and more with a broad Tanzanian identity rooted in use of Swahili language. As a result, Tanzanian politics is not ethnic politics. Parties do not make ethnic appeals nor do they organize around ethnic groups.

Because CCM was the only party allowed for a long time, the line between CCM and the state is often very blurred (Hyden & Mmuya, 2008). Before 1992, there was no separation. Indeed, many contemporary state institutions started as party ones. Today, there is a formal separation of party and state. However, this is often irrelevant with party officials having more say than civil servants. The CCM is a well-funded, highly institutionalized political party in part because of these strong links with the state and the use of state resources for party business. In this section, I outline briefly the history of political parties and political competition in Tanzania.

2.1 One Party Era

Before World War One, Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) was a German colony. After the War, Tanganyika was a British colony until 1961. Tanzania was ruled by indirect rule. Unlike neighboring Kenya, it was not viewed as a settler state and so little investment was put into the state. During the late colonial period, TANU pressured the British for independence. Much of the mobilization was concentrated in Northeastern Tanzania especially

⁴Scholars often attribute Tanzania's stability to the CCM's pluralism, links with society and intra-party democracy (Ekman, 2009; Morse, 2015, 2018)

Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Mara regions (Ilfie, 1979). Upon independence, TANU took over. For around a year, TANU allowed multiple parties but this was quickly abandoned. This ushered in a thirty year period of one party rule (Hyden, 1997).

TANU was an African socialist party. Under President Nyerere, TANU expanded party institutions from its urban, petty bourgeoisie origins into the countryside (Morse, 2018). In 1967, Nyerere proclaimed *ujamaa* to be the new organizing policy of the country in the Arusha Declaration. *Ujamaa*, a Swahili word variously translated as socialism, brotherhood, working together, familyhood, describes a set of policies which formalized the role of the state in the economy and society (Lal, 2015).

The cornerstone of *ujamaa* was the policy of villagization with which *ujamaa* has become synonymous. Most Tanzanians at independence lived in homesteads and not in centralized villages. *Ujamaa* moved a large number of Tanzanians into centralized villages with communal farms, often a primary school and always a TANU village office between the late 60s and mid 70s. In the early days of *ujamaa* people moved for ideological reasons and later because of material inducements. Some areas which resisted were moved by force in the mid 1970s. By the time the program was abandoned in 1976, many Tanzanians did not live in *ujamaa* villages (Hyden, 1980). Despite playing a central role in TANU at independence, citizens in Northeastern Tanzania were most resistant to resettling (Lofchie, 1994).

TANU and CCM held legislative and local elections during the one-party period. Candidates were not permitted to criticize TANU and competed primarily on their competence to administer their roles at the local level (Hyden et al, 1972). These local politicians played an important role in gathering information on citizens for the regime (Widner, 1992). The civil service was highly political, even radicalized during the time (Cheeseman, 2012). The local party state was therefore important to the stability of the one party regime.

Despite hopes that *ujamaa* would lead to a growth in productivity, the Tanzanian economy shrunk over the 1970s (Muganda, 2004). By the early 1980s, the economy was in crisis. As a result, Tanzania committed to structural adjustment in 1986 after which the economy started to grow again (ibid). The Tanzanian state was hard hit by structural adjustment especially at the local level (Ngware, 1992). This weakened CCM's hold on power. However, there was little opposition mobilization during the one party period. Way attributes opposition weakness to high state employment and the weakness of the private sector (Way, 2012).

2.2 Multiparty Politics

Tanzania moved to multiparty competition in the early 1990s. This reform was an example of a regime 'jumping before it was pushed' (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In 1990, Nyerere called for the introduction of multiparty elections after observing the fall of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. He was quoted at the time as stating "*[Why liberalize?] When you see your neighbor being shaved, you should wet your beard. Otherwise you could*




Figure 3: Opposition legislative support over time

get a rough shave” (Morna, 1990). Keen to stay in the good graces of international finance institutions (IFIs) and avoid mass mobilization against the regime, Tanzania legalized opposition parties in 1992 and held its first multiparty elections in 1995 (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

The CCM won early elections with relative ease. Since multipartyism was introduced, there have been three CCM Presidents. The CCM candidate Benjamin Mkapa won the founding presidential election with 62% of the vote. The largest opposition party, NCCR-Mageuzi, got around 28% of the vote. NCCR-Mageuzi is a centrist party which won support across Tanzania but never topped its 1995 showing.

In the subsequent presidential elections, the CCM actually extended their lead with 72% in 2000 and 80% in 2005 when Jakaya Kikwete took over as President. Over these elections, opposition support became more fragmented across parties with the most popular opposition party winning 16% and 12% of the presidential vote respectively. In 2000 and 2005, Civic United Front (CUF) won the largest share. CUF’s main policy is Zanzibar independence. Unsurprisingly, their electoral base is Zanzibar and the Swahili coast and they win around 10% of the vote at each election. Given how noncompetitive these elections were, the CCM had little need to resort to violence or electoral fraud during these elections.

However, the tide started to turn in 2010. The opposition was able to almost double its share of the vote with the biggest opposition party, Chadema, gaining 27% of the vote. Chadema is a center-right party with its base in northeastern Tanzania. In 2015, Chadema won 40% of the presidential vote against current President John Magufuli. Legislative elections show similar patterns as shown in Figure 3. During this election, opposition




Figure 4: Opposition control and support by local government in 2005, 2010 and 2015 local elections

parties coordinated under one movement, *Ukawa*.⁵

Most of the opposition parties mentioned have won control of local governments and all of them have won control of community administrations. Local politics is particularly important to Chadema’s electoral strategy. Chadema won control of two (of three total opposition) local governments (LGs) in 2005, seven (of eight total opposition) LGs in 2010 and twenty five (of thirty one total opposition) LGs in 2015. Chadema also dominates the other opposition parties in terms of control of wards (the electoral units which make up LGs) and community administrations. After the 2015 election, Chadema had local control in the majority of urban areas in Tanzania. Figure 4 shows the spread of opposition support and control at the local level. Elections became more competitive and opposition support coordinated around Chadema. As I will argue in this dissertation, this precipitated a shift in CCM strategy in part because this opposition support translated in greater and greater losses of local control.

After the 2015 election, there was a marked uptick in legal restrictions on opposition parties and violence directed against them. Rallies have long been the main way political parties communicate with voters in Tanzania (Paget, 2018). In 2016, the government banned rallies between elections. They have subsequently

⁵Most opposition parties still had presidential candidates but Lowassa was seen as the coalition candidate, formally under Chadema. This arrangement was necessary to make sure that all parties still received state funding after the election.

exploited the ambiguities of this change in the law to arrest opposition politicians for conducting party business. This legal change was just the first move in a long string of legal reforms which shrunk the space for opposition parties and opposition to the regime more broadly in Tanzania. In 2019, parliament passed a new set of laws which gives the presidentially appointed registrar sweeping powers. The registrar can impose heavy fines and jail time and deregister parties if parties do not abide by a strict set of rules governing all aspects of their external and internal operations including party meetings, finances and contact with voters (Ng'wanakilala, 2019).

In contrast to much of Tanzania's history, violence is now a prominent part of Tanzanian politics. In the aftermath of the 2015 election, Alphonse Mawezo, a Chadema party organizer, in President Magufuli's home region of Geita was murdered by CCM youth militia during a Chadema meeting. Since then, violence against opposition politicians and supporters has been increasing year-on-year. In 2017, Opposition Whip and MP for Singida, Tundu Lissu, was shot 47 times by men armed with machine guns inside normally heavily guarded MPs' compound in Dodoma.⁶ Several other opposition politicians and activists, both local and national, have been killed or survived attempts on their lives. Others have been kidnapped before then being found in rural areas in bad physical condition, brought to court or never seen again.⁷ Opposition politicians regularly face politicized charges in the courts. The overwhelming majority of this harassment and violence targets Chadema politicians.⁸

Tanzanian politics has changed significantly over the course of the multiparty period. Support for opposition parties, especially for Chadema, has increased. Furthermore, the way that the ruling party manages politics has also changed. In the early days of multipartyism there was little violence or manipulation and Tanzania was broadly regarded as a peaceful dominant party regime. In recent years, the CCM has resorted to more and more extreme tactics to contain the threat from opposition parties. In this dissertation, I argue that both of these shifts can be explained by local control and strategic responses to it.

3 History of Local Government in Tanzania

I now turn to the history of subnational government in Tanzania. Like many other electoral autocracies in the developing world, Tanzania is a decentralized country. However, the structure of local institutions has changed a lot over the country's history. In this section, I briefly review the history of centralization and decentralization in Tanzania. I then provide an overview of the 2000 decentralization reforms which serve as the institutional

⁶Lissu survived against all odds and is currently living in exile in Belgium. He is expected to return to Tanzania in late 2019 to contest for the presidency in 2020.

⁷The government does not claim responsibility for this violence. Instead it blames 'unknown assailants'. However, there have been no investigations into these unknown assailants and it is commonly understood that Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Services (TISS or *Usalama wa Taifa*) are responsible.

⁸The notable exception to this is Zitto Kabwe, leader of ACT-Wazalendo and MP for Kigoma. The former Chadema deputy leader formed ACT after being expelled from Chadema over claims he was trying to unseat Freeman Mbowe, the party chairman, in 2013. Zitto Kabwe is a popular politician with a large social media following and extensive international connections. He has been one of Magufuli's most vocal critics.

backdrop of the rest of the dissertation.

3.1 Pre-Reform Institutional Arrangements

During the British colonial period, Tanzania was governed by indirect rule. Colonial administrators created ‘native authorities’ headed by traditional leaders in rural areas and governed urban areas directly. Traditional leaders had coercive and administrative powers but little real state capacity. Native authorities were designed to be a low-cost way of subjugating colonial subjects and extracting resources rather than building any kind of meaningful local institutions (Mamdani, 2003). In 1953, the Local Government Ordinance introduced municipal, town and district councils, which were elected and non-partisan each headed by one African, one Asian and one European, in some more urbanized or commercialized parts of the country. At the time of independence, Tanzania was governed by a combination of these councils and Native Authorities.

After independence in 1961, Native Authorities and Councils were replaced with Local Authorities (LAs). While the colonial administrators only provided incredibly basic public services, TANU was committed to drastically increasing public services and tasked LAs with much of them. However, many of these LAs lacked the state capacity, money or expertise to do so. This meant that LAs did little governing and the central government had control of almost all functions of the state. The system of Local Authorities collapsed by the early 1970s (Kessy & McCourt, 2010).

During the *ujamaa* period, TANU committed to more serious decentralization. Reforms in the early 1970s moved responsibilities for local development (including the implementation of flagship policies like extending Swahili-language primary education) to local governments. These reforms stressed public participation in planning. These reforms were expected to increase productivity and improve access to public services in rural communities. There was little to no separation between party and state during this period. These reforms were also intended to increase the coercive reach of the state (Hyden et al, 1972). Below these local governments, TANU created extensive party institutions at the community level. Modeled on the organization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao, Nyerere pushed for citizens to organize into centralized villages with communal farming and substantial party presence (Lal, 2015). TANU created a ten cell system, with a party member in charge of monitoring every ten households (Levitsky & Way, 2010). However, the promises of *ujamaa* decentralization did not materialize. There were widespread food shortages and mismanagement and abuse of local institutions, which perversely increased the powers of central government. The quality of services fell significantly in urban areas (Ergaz, 1980). As the 1970s went on, *ujamaa* institutions became unfit for purpose.

In 1982, pre-*ujamaa* institutional arrangements were restored. Local Government Authorities existed but they lacked staff, capacity and powers to tax (Kessy & McCourt, 2010). This meant that the overwhelming

majority of service delivery was done by the central government through the conduit of regional administrations. However, this recentralization did not solve service delivery problems and quality of public services remained low. The Local Government Reform Programme (2000) increased the resources, autonomy and capacity of these local governments so that service delivery was decentralized in practice for the first time in post-independence Tanzanian history. In the rest of this section, I explain why the Tanzanian government introduced these reforms and before then outlining the contents of these reforms.

3.2 The Decision to Decentralize

As with the introduction of multiparty elections, decentralization reforms, the prevalence of them in developing countries and their broad timing was the result of decisions made by IFIs. Domestic politics then played a greater role in determining the form and the precise timing these reforms took in each country (Dickovick & Riedl, 2013). This is also the case in Tanzania.

It is hard to pull apart the decision to introduce multiparty competition and the decision to decentralize in Tanzania and other developing countries. Decentralization and multiparty elections were both key priorities of IFIs' broader pro-participation, pro-liberalization agenda in the aftermath of the Cold War (Manor, 1999). At the time, a significant portion of the budgets of many countries in the developing world came from IFIs. This gave the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and donors governments substantial leverage to push this agenda. Given this, many countries decentralized and they did so around a similar time that they introduced multiparty elections.

Tanzania was a donor darling in the 1990s and 2000s (Harrison and Mulley 2007; Nord et al. 2009; Edwards 2014; Lofchie 2014).⁹ As discussed above, Tanzania introduced multiparty elections to curry favor with donors and decentralized for a similar reason (Hyden, 1999; Bakari, 2001).¹⁰ They received substantial budgetary support from the World Bank throughout this time, which they were understandably scared of losing (Harrison, 2001). Decentralization itself was funded by donors. In 1998, the Tanzania government published a policy paper which they used to solicit donor funding from the Common Basket Fund (PMORALG, 2005). By reforming, Tanzania was able to stay in the good graces of donors. Indeed, after decentralizing, the World Bank funded a massive program to expand access to secondary education which built hundreds of secondary schools between 2005 and 2010 (World Bank, 2004). The Tanzanian government faced international pressure and significant fiscal incentives to decentralize.

However, there was also domestic pressure to reform local institutions. As discussed in the previous subsection, local institutions were not fit for purpose by the 1990s (Ngware, 1992). IFIs promised to rehabilitate these institutions. In return for their commitment to decentralization, Tanzania received a spending package

⁹In the last 5 years, Tanzania has become substantially less popular with donors.

¹⁰This was corroborated by interviews with stakeholders in the decentralization process

which trained local bureaucrats and funded the restructuring necessary. The CCM was confident decentralization would strengthen their hand by increasing their local presence and winning support by improving service delivery.¹¹ Decentralization was therefore included as part of the CCM’s 1995 founding election platform. This was also a way of signalling their commitment to eventually decentralize to the IFIs.¹²

3.3 The Reforms

The Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) was a set of decentralization reforms passed in 2000 to restructure and repurpose subnational institutions in Tanzania. As discussed above, local government existed in Tanzania before the LGRP but it was so under-resourced and lacking in capacity that it was completely marginalized by the central government. The LGRP increased local capacity and ceded local governments and other subnational institutions new powers that gave subnational institutions much more say over local affairs.




Figure 5: Levels of government in Tanzania

The LGRP stripped back the powers of regional administrations which are now primarily a backstop for local governments. The LGRP is often referred to as ‘*decentralization by devolution*’ because the reforms involved substantial political decentralization. It created elected local councils with substantial distributive powers. Each ward elects a councilor to the local government. There are also special seats for women on these councils. Which party controls the LG is whichever party can form a majority on the council. I summarize these levels in Figure 5. Local governments were given primary responsibility for service delivery in key areas like primary education, water, health and local roads. The administrative capacity of local governments was increased by

¹¹Interviews with stakeholders in decentralization process
¹²Tanzania decentralized slightly later than comparable cases

restructuring them into service delivery units staffed by civil servants that would otherwise have been at the ministry level or primarily accountable to it. Local governments were also given new tax raising powers and the central government is legally required to provide block funding to them for their own discretionary development projects.

The LGRP also strengthened grassroots institutions. It created common community-level institutions by introducing street chairpeople and committees in urban areas and strengthening village chairpeople (VCs¹³) and committees in rural areas. These institutions, which I refer to as community administrations, became the frontline of the state. Community administrations act as the gatekeeper to public resources and services. These elected chairpeople verify voters' identities and provide referrals to government agencies and services. Chairpeople also oversee development projects in their communities. They chair a village/street assembly, which is made up of all citizens and is a space for voters to discuss the needs of the community. VCs are not new. During *ujamaa*, village party leaders were highly powerful. However, their importance and the resources and powers they could mobilize waned. Decentralization rehabilitated these old party roles and turned them into elected state role. As I will argue, the ambiguity between state and party here is actually a problem for the CCM. Highly local organizational capacity, formerly exclusively under the purview of the ruling party and central to scholars' appraisals of its strength, can be taken over by opposition parties.

Tanzania decentralized in two phases. Initially, the Tanzanian government had planned to decentralize on a rolling basis. However, after putting in place decentralization reforms in the first group of councils around 2001/02 (just less than a third of all councils), the government put the rest of the program on hold until they had enough resources to complete it.¹⁴ This meant that all other councils decentralized three years later around the 2005 election. Importantly, the phase one councils were not those which were most ready to decentralize. According to the consultants hired to evaluate the reforms, selection to the program was done to maximize geographical spread rather than '*on the basis of financial viability, accountability and management*'.¹⁵ The phasing of decentralization was not 'random'. However, the order of decentralization was exogenous to local capacity or readiness to decentralize at the time of decentralization. Phase 1 areas are slightly wealthier and more urban than Phase 2 areas but the areas are balanced on population size, opposition support in the 1995 and 2000 elections and the rate of uncontested elections in 2000. Thus, parts of Tanzania decentralized almost a whole electoral cycle earlier than the rest.

¹³I use VC to refer to both urban and rural chairpeople for ease of exposition

¹⁴Tanzanian government planning document, 2003. Found in the Tamisemi archive.

¹⁵KPMG report prepared for the Tanzanian government and stakeholders, 2002. Found in the Tamisemi archive

4 How Local Government Works

I now outline how subnational institutions operate. I focus on local elections, dual executive, local government finance, service delivery and security apparatus as these are the elements of local governance most relevant to my argument.

4.1 Local Elections

Local elections are held at multiple levels in Tanzania: ward, village/street and subvillage. These elections determine who controls the local state capacity associated with each office. Local elections are often more competitive than national elections and turnout is comparable. Elections for ward councilors are held at the same time as presidential and parliamentary elections. Local council elections are run by the National Electoral Commission. Elections for village/street chairperson are held a year prior to local council elections. These elections are run by local governments themselves. All these elections are partisan. Opposition politicians, if they win these local elections, take on the powers and responsibilities of that office. However, as I will discuss, the autonomy of incumbent and opposition politicians differs given they must operate in a system otherwise dominated by the incumbent. This influences how freely the elected local politician can allocate resources and how they can use their coercive powers.

4.2 Dual Executive

Elected politicians work with appointed officials. At all levels, there is a dual executive structure. I summarize this in Figure 6. Ward councilors work together with a ward executive officer (WEO), an appointed bureaucrat, to coordinate development activities and oversee service delivery in the ward. Likewise the chairperson is paired with a village executive officer (VEO) to oversee administrative duties and development in the community. WEOs and VEOs are appointed by the President's Office for Regional Administration and Local Government (TAMISEMI). They generally work in a different region than where they are from and are cycled regularly.

At the ward level, the councilor chairs the ward development committee (WDC) which makes decisions about how to allocate spending within the ward and what to request from the local government budget. The WEO and the VCs and VEOs of the constituent communities also sit on the WDC. At the community level, the village development committee is chaired by the VC and made up of subvillage elected politicians and the VEO and any other village or subvillage bureaucrats who may be present in the area. They consult with the village assembly which is made up of all voting age adults who live in the community. Distributive decisions are made by committee and the elected officials' votes do not count for more. WEOs and VEOs are legally non-partisan but are generally thought to be loyal to the CCM, not least because they are answerable to presidential




Figure 6: Dual executive structure

appointees. Their presence on these committees makes sure that the ruling party and its interests have a voice on these committees even in highly opposition areas. However, elected politicians do have more executive powers especially when it comes to the coercive capacity of the state.

Local governments are also headed by a dual executive. Ward councilors nominate a mayor in urban areas or chair in rural areas.¹⁶ These mayors are the political head of the local government and they chair important committees in the local government, including the finance committee which has final say over the specifics of how the budget is used. They run the local government together with a municipal director in urban areas or district executive director in rural areas.¹⁷ The Executive Director is appointed by the President and is a non-partisan role. In practice, Executive Directors are often CCM party members or even CCM politicians. The bureaucrats who work in the local government are answerable directly to the Executive Director. Twice a year, local governments hold full council meetings where they vote on how council resources will be spent in the coming months. The full council is made up of the mayor, executive director along with all of the councilors and all of the senior bureaucrats. Like development committees are the lower levels, the bureaucrats' presence on these committee stack the odds against opposition councilors' ability to allocate resources. With these decision-making procedures established, I now explain how local governments and community administrations deliver public services and how they fund them.

¹⁶For clarity of exposition, I use mayor as a catch-all for political executive leaders of local governments to avoid confusion with village chairpeople

¹⁷I refer to them interchangeably as the Executive Director

4.3 Local Finances and Public Service Delivery

Local governments in Tanzania are responsible for funding local services through local governments budgets. The majority of local government budgets come from central transfers. The LGRP defines a formula for these transfers based on population, poverty rate and area. The allotted central transfers are divided between ‘OCs’ and development. OCs pay for administrative costs and staffing. Development funding is money that LGs can use for their own projects without permission of the central government. However, actual transfers bear little resemblance to the predictions of this formula (Weinstein, 2011). Opposition councils have faced lower transfers since they began winning power in the 00s (ibid). Furthermore, the central government may choose to send little or no money for development money to some councils. Instead, they may send discretionary grants for specific projects direct from ministerial budgets. These grants come with specific uses and locations already determined. They may also do send these kinds of grants alongside normal development spending.

Local government have the power to collect local taxes. Local taxes (often referred to as ‘own source revenues’) can be used autonomously by local governments. Local governments can raise revenues from a set of taxes standard across all local governments or they can create novel taxes implemented in their LG alone. To introduce a new tax or vary the rate of an existing tax, the politicians must get sign off. In the past, this was simply from the Executive Director of the local government. Now, sign off must come from TAMISEMI. The way in which tax is collected is at the discretion of the local government. Tax collection is done by LG bureaucrats and their subordinates at the ward and community levels. There is no standardization across LGs about how local bureaucrats engage in tax collection and how much time or budget should be spent on tax collection. It is the discretion of the leadership of the LG how much LG resources and capacity are directed towards tax collection. A lot of tax collection is ad hoc and informal. Local governments can also create municipal capital projects - markets, malls, bus stations - to generate revenues from service fees. If this requires outside financing, these projects require TAMISEMI sign-off. Thus, local governments have a range of fiscal powers but the regime maintains a gate-keeping role.

Once the total available budget is determined, the council votes on how to spend it.¹⁸ Often these discretionary budgets are limited enough that LGs cannot afford to finance capital-intensive projects like school-building or major water point construction without either neglecting their day-to-day responsibilities or getting assistance from the central government. These projects formally fall within the remit of local governments but LGs lack the funds to use these powers independent of the central government. This especially true in opposition areas where development budgets are lower and few discretionary grants are allocated.

What local governments can control is therefore defined less by the rules of decentralization and more by the

¹⁸The central government must sign off on these plans. The central government and the local government generally agree on a budget ceiling (a maximum amount of money that the LG can spend in a given year regardless of the source of the money) before the council decides how to allocate money. However, on occasion, the central government may intervene again at the sign off stage to impose a new, lower budget ceiling and limit the projects that the local government can implement.

resources they can call on. Large capital projects generally must be co-produced with the central government. When they co-produce public goods, the central government has substantial leverage over local government, which means that central government can dictate where that public good is allocated, what kind of project it is etc. However, local governments still have significant distribute powers which they can use independent of the central government. Local governments can fund less expensive public good projects like classrooms and local roads. They can also decide how to use local government staff and capacity, changing priorities and protocols to improve the performance of local services. They can respond to local crises and issues like public health.

Once the council decides on its priorities and plans, service delivery units are tasked with implementing these plans. Each service delivery unit specializes in a particular policy area e.g. health, primary education. The bureaucrats in these units are exclusively accountable to the Executive Director. They often work closely with the relevant ministry who may exert pressure on them to respect central government preferences. When the wishes of the council, Executive Director and ministry are aligned then this chain of accountability is irrelevant. If the bureaucrats find themselves between the council and the Executive Director and the ministry, bureaucrats can use their administrative powers to act in favor of one side or another. To prevent this, politicians can choose to monitor service delivery throughout the implementation process.

Many LG projects are allocated to a specific ward or community. The elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats in these units often assist with implementation, particularly in coordinating public contributions like volunteer labor or any financial contribution. Wards and communities can create their own projects through ward and village development committees. Wards and communities are supposed to receive a small amount of discretionary funding each year to fund these projects. Citizens are also expected to contribute to these projects. However, often this discretionary money does not come or is delayed. Given this, one of the main roles of ward councilors and community chairpeople is to try and secure assistance for these projects in the LG budget or from outside donors. Absent this additional funding, WDCs and VDCs can fund projects through local contributions or prioritize projects which only require manpower.

4.4 Local Security Apparatus

The local security apparatus in Tanzania is made up of both central (e.g. TISS, CCM grassroots networks) and local institutions. District and Regional Commissioners (DCs, RCs) are presidential appointees who act as the executive at the LG and Region level. These positions have existed since the colonial period when these colonial officers had sweeping powers to administer their districts or provinces. Today, elected and technocratic offices have taken over many of the roles of the colonial DCs. In principle, contemporary RCs and DCs advise LGs, oversee law and order and intervene in politics only when necessary. In practice, their executive powers and ability to mobilize the local police gives RCs and DCs significant coercive powers and influence over local policy.

DCs are described as the ‘president in the district’, supreme over the elected mayors and appointed executive director as shown in Figure 6. Often RCs and DCs are former military officers or CCM party stalwarts who lost at the last election or have retired from electoral politics. Given their extensive powers and their close links to the ruling party, RCs and DCs play an important role in the local security apparatus.

Village/street chairs (VCs) also have important coercive powers. VCs have the final say in disputes between citizens and all matters of order and security. They convene security councils which have substantial powers and often act as a quasi-state militia at the community level. Complaints against residents are seldom handed to higher levels of the security apparatus and are generally handled by the security council and VC. The VC can impose heavy punishments, ranging from fines to exile, labor duties to confiscation of property. VCs’ embeddedness in the community gives them substantial information about their constituents. Given their coercive powers and their information, VCs play a particularly important role in monitoring voters and enforcing low-intensity coercion.

5 Subnational cases

I now turn to my subnational cases. I use subnational comparison in my quantitative and qualitative analysis. I use quantitative data to compare LGs, wards and communities from across the whole country. I outline the methodology involved in each of these analyses in the empirical chapters which follow. In this section, I focus on how I use subnational comparison in my qualitative analysis. Before presenting necessary background information about the subnational cases I focus on, I explain the role of these subnational cases in my research design, my subnational case selection logic and how I conducted my case studies.

5.1 Qualitative methodology

I use qualitative data in this study in three main ways. First, I use it to gather data on distributive and violent politics that are hard to measure with quantitative data. Qualitative interviews are particularly useful in understanding how ruling and opposition parties use distribution and violence at the very local level. Second, I use it to understand and characterise the strategies that opposition and ruling party politicians use in local government. I often then use quantitative data to test the strategies described to me by politicians. Unlike work which takes a deductive approach to authoritarian strategy given a set of assumptions, I take an inductive approach. Third, I use interviews to trace how citizens respond to these strategies, specifically how it affects their vote choice, perceptions of different parties and their competence and how local party politics affects communities.

I use subnational cases differently in the earlier and later chapters of this dissertation. In the first three

empirical chapters, I contrast incumbent and opposition control using interviews from subnational cases alongside quantitative data from the whole country. I treat local control as dichotomous in the first half of the book because I am interested in the effect of local control on the strategies incumbent and opposition parties can call on. In the second half of the dissertation, I focus on an additional dimension of variation between these cases: whether opposition is tolerated or repressed.

As I discuss in this chapter, overt repression of opposition areas does not begin until after 2015. All of my election data and much of my data on service provision only covers up to 2015. I conducted my original survey in the months before the 2015 election. I can therefore use my quantitative analysis in the first half of the project to explore the effects of local control and how this influences vote choice holding constant incumbent response to local control. I use interviews in this section of the dissertation to characterize the powers and strategies available to local politicians by local control. Most of my interviews were done in 2016 and 2017. However, this is not necessarily a problem for my analysis. In this section, I focus on the mechanics of local control - how local and community government functions, the opportunities it gives opposition parties and the constraints it places on incumbents - which remains broadly similar before and after 2015.

In the second half of the dissertation, I trace changes in how the CCM respond to opposition local control, how opposition parties respond to them and how this shift affects citizens' behavior and vote choice. In one of my opposition case regions, opposition support and local control was still tolerated.¹⁹ In the other, the CCM cracked down on opposition local control. I did many of my interviews during the biggest crackdown on opposition parties that Tanzania had ever seen. This gave me the opportunity to interrogate how opposition and incumbent politicians as well as voters were strategically responding to these changes as they were happening while avoiding recall bias.²⁰ This section of the project focuses on a time where the 'old rules' are thrown out in the one of my subnational cases but remain more constant in the other two case regions. This allows me to explore how the dynamics of local politics change in response to violence.

I selected Dodoma, Kilimanjaro and Iringa regions as my main subnational cases which I plot in Figure 7. Within each of these regions, I focus on two local government areas, one municipality and its neighboring rural district. The municipalities in each of these cases are small cities with similar economic profiles and similar levels of ethnic and religious heterogeneity. They all have more foreign and NGO presence than most places in Tanzania and have good transport links. They are all around eight hours from Dar es Salaam. By holding constant demographic and geographic characteristics, I can focus on the implications of variation in local control and later incumbent responses thereto.

In each of my main cases, I interviewed voters who supported any party or none. I interviewed Chadema

¹⁹As I discuss below, the lack of repression in this case makes it something of an outlier

²⁰If I hypothetically did the same interview work in the years following the crackdown, one might worry that respondents would misrepresent or not correctly recall their decision-making during the crackdown. This could take many forms - they may only report the strategies that worked, understate the challenges they faced or overstate them - and doing interview contemporaneously avoids these problems.




Figure 7: Main subnational cases

and CCM councilors and VCs. I also interviewed bureaucrats in each of these LGs. In each LG, I interviewed bureaucrats who held the same jobs.²¹ In my additional cases, I only interviewed voters and Chadema politicians. I also did interviews with central bureaucrats and senior opposition party figures. In total, I did over 200 interviews between 2015 and 2018. These interviews were all semi-structured and open-ended.

I gained extensive access to understandably cautious local networks of opposition politicians and activists and their ruling party counterparts through years of trust-building. I worked through party leaders at the national level and built relationships with local party bosses who then granted me access to the kinds of local politicians I write about. I had to go through a similar process to gain access to the bureaucrats I interviewed. My dissertation relies on subnational variation which meant I had to both travel extensively and build trust and networks in several places. In this study, I argue that local control can create very different political units within a given non-democratic country. To make that argument, it was important I got a sense of how local politics and daily life worked in all of my case studies. Living in these places and my interviews themselves gave me insights into opposition and incumbent strategy and how these strategies affect citizens.

The sensitivity of the subject matter of this study made respondent safeguarding central to this project. I regularly checked in with respondents whether they wanted to continue the interview. Furthermore, I only asked sensitive questions if the respondent indicated a will to engage with political topics. For example, if a respondent steered away from less sensitive but still political questions, I did not ask the more sensitive questions. I intentionally designed my interviews to be able to assess the comfort and openness of the respondent on an

²¹I do not include what jobs those are to protect their anonymity. I anonymize quotes from these bureaucrats by making references to the public services they are in charge of more general/vague.

ongoing basis to then assess whether it was appropriate for their safety and mine to ask more sensitive questions. I try and anonymize my interviews as much as possible. For politicians, I only indicate their party, their role and their LG. I do not include the name of the subnational unit they are responsible for. For voters, I only include their LG and which party controls their community (e.g. a voter in a CCM community in Dodoma). For bureaucrats, I only indicate their LG to preserve their anonymity. I also edit quotes where necessary to remove direct references to their roles. Unlike for politicians and voters where there are several opposition communities, opposition wards etc, it would be much easier to identify bureaucrats if I made clear that the quote was attributable to someone working in the service delivery unit for clinics or that their job was to monitor the distribution of medical supplies. With this level of detail, no exact date for the interview reported in the text and the high rate of cycling of bureaucrats, it would be difficult to identify the bureaucrats from the text I provide here.

5.2 Dodoma

Dodoma is a region in central Tanzania. The main urban settlement in Dodoma region is Dodoma, a town of four hundred thousand people and the official capital of Tanzania. Dodoma was initially a small village that grew as a railway town during the German colonial period. The British favored Dodoma less than the Germans and the town remained small. It became official capital during the *ujamaa* period because of its central location (Kironde, 1993). Despite being the capital for many decades, the majority of ministries as well as the State House remain in Dar es Salaam.²² The economy of Dodoma town centers around agriculture and businesses and services catering to the government offices and NGOs there.

Most of the rest of the region is rural and the economy is primarily agrarian. Dodoma region is semi-arid and prone to drought. I interviewed voters, politicians and bureaucrats in the primarily urban Dodoma Municipal Council (MC) and the rural Chamwino District Council (DC), which wraps around the North, East and South of Dodoma Town. People in this area are below Tanzanian average in terms of education and income. Most people in these areas are Christians from the Gogo ethnic group. There is a Muslim population in Dodoma town.

Dodoma is a CCM stronghold. In the rural areas, there are very low levels of opposition support, very few opposition councilors and a handful of VCs. In Dodoma town, opposition parties win a handful of ward council seats and a reasonable number of VC offices. In Chamwino, the opposition has almost no presence with no ward councilors and a very small number of VC offices. The low level of opposition presence makes Dodoma much like large parts of Tanzania, especially before 2015. I use this case as a way of exploring how politics ‘normally’ works in decentralized electoral autocracies i.e. absent opposition control. One may be concerned that politics

²²Dar es Salaam is the commercial capital with a population of around five million people.

in Dodoma are not representative of other incumbent strongholds because it is the official capital. However, it is important to note that national government employees make up a very small proportion of the residents of Dodoma as most government agencies and offices were still in Dar es Salaam during my fieldwork. Furthermore, I include additional evidence from other incumbent areas, which I outline in section 5.4.

5.3 Kilimanjaro

Kilimanjaro is a region in northeastern Tanzania on the border with Kenya. It is named for Mount Kilimanjaro, Africa's tallest mountain, which is in the North of the region. The main urban settlement in Kilimanjaro is Moshi, a town of around two hundred thousand people²³. Moshi is also a former German railway town. Northern Kilimanjaro was a hub for early Christian missionaries and produced cash crops during the colonial period (Dundas, 1968). Today, Kilimanjaro is the most educated part of Tanzania and one of the wealthiest. I focus on Moshi MC and the nearby rural district of Moshi DC. Moshi's economy is made up primarily of tourism, brewing, agriculture and a small number of export-import business. There is heavy NGO presence in Moshi. The rural districts' economies are based on agriculture, especially coffee and bananas. Most people in Northern Tanzania are ethnically Chagga Christians. There is a reasonably sized Muslim population in Moshi town.

Kilimanjaro has long been a center of political opposition. People from Kilimanjaro were well represented in TANU, the political movement against colonialism which later became the present-day ruling party. However, Kilimanjaro's relationship with TANU soured during the *ujamaa* period after people in the area resisted villagization (Illife, 1979). Since multipartyism was introduced, most parts of Kilimanjaro have supported opposition parties over the CCM. Chadema was founded in Kilimanjaro with much of the leadership to this day made up of Chaggas from Kilimanjaro. Opposition parties have had control of local governments in different parts of Northern Kilimanjaro since 2005. Since 2015, Chadema has local control of all LGs in Northern Kilimanjaro. CCM had controlled Moshi DC from 2010 to 2015 because Chadema and another opposition party split the vote. In 2015, those two parties formed a coalition to run Moshi DC. Kilimanjaro regularly has one of the highest opposition vote share in general and local elections.

Kilimanjaro is a useful case for several reasons. It allows me to explore how opposition local control works before and after 2015. One may be worried that politics in Kilimanjaro are not representative of opposition control elsewhere because it is a wealthy opposition stronghold. Wealthy regions are often the most likely areas to support opposition parties in electoral autocracies (Arriola, Dow & Letsa, 2019). To understand the dynamics of opposition politics in electoral autocracies, it is important to understand their strongholds. However, to

²³Moshi is said to double in size during the day. Many people work in town but still live in their ancestral villages, a strong tradition among the Chagga ethnic group predominant in the North of the region. The Chagga resisted *ujamaa* to preserve these settlements

understand how opposition parties win support outside of these most likely regions, it is important to also consider a less likely case as I do by including Iringa. Furthermore, focusing on this case allows me to explore how long-standing strongholds are treated differently during a crackdown. As I will discuss in this dissertation, opposition support is largely tolerated in Kilimanjaro and there is significantly less violence. The differences in incumbent response to opposition control in Kilimanjaro and in other opposition areas is an important dimension of subnational variation to explore.

5.4 Iringa

Iringa is a region in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. Iringa Town is the capital with a population similar to that of Moshi. Most of the rest of the region is rural. The Germans established the town in the late 19th century as a military outpost against the dominant Hehe ethnic group, who violently resisted colonial rule (Gewald, 2008). Iringa is below average in terms of income and education and is marginally poorer than Dodoma. It has one of the highest rates of HIV/AIDs in Tanzania at fourteen per cent of the population, many of whom are reliant on public treatment programs (Tomori et al, 2014). I focus on the urban Iringa MC and the rural Iringa DC. Iringa MC's economy made up of tourism, agriculture and industrial food processing. There is also significant NGO presence, especially Anglican Christian organizations. Iringa DC's economy is primarily agrarian. Most people in these LGs are ethnic Hehe Christians. There is a small Muslim population in the town.

Iringa has a mixed political history. In the founding election, Iringa Municipal elected an opposition MP.²⁴ However, after the 1995 election, opposition support fell dramatically and the area elected CCM MPs in the next two elections. There was low support for opposition parties in local elections. In 2010, Iringa MC elected Peter Msigwa of a firebrand former pastor from Chadema as MP. They narrowly lost out on control of the municipal council in 2010. They won it by a substantial margin in 2015. Iringa DC has never had an opposition MP or opposition control of the LG. Iringa DC elects a number of opposition councilors and a sizeable number of opposition VCs.²⁵ Support for opposition parties in Iringa DC is on the rise.

Iringa is more than a second case of opposition control. It is a case where the levels of opposition support are perhaps surprising. Unlike Kilimanjaro, the vast majority of the population rely on the state for education, healthcare and so on. It is also an area that does not have much post-colonial history of opposition. I consider Iringa as an area that supports opposition parties not because of demographics but despite demographics. Voters in Iringa are convinced of the credibility of Chadema. Despite Iringa's very different demographics

²⁴Most urban areas in Tanzania elected opposition MPs from NCCR-Mageuzi in the founding election. Urban areas rejected CCM in the founding elections because, unlike most other African countries, pre-liberalization Tanzania was a place characterized by urban-neglect rather than rural-neglect. NCCR-Mageuzi campaigned on improving public services and reducing urban unemployment (Rickey & Ponte, 1996) Support for NCCR-Mageuzi quickly folded after this election.

²⁵The proportions are comparable to Dodoma MC.

from Kilimanjaro, they support the same party with much of the same fervour. Furthermore, the ruling CCM responded very differently to opposition control in Iringa than in Kilimanjaro. As I will outline in the next subsection, Iringa is actually typical of the crackdown that befell and continues to befall opposition areas in Tanzania.

5.5 Additional subnational cases

At points throughout the dissertation, I include evidence from supplemental cases which I plot in Figure 8 alongside my main cases. First, I do this to reduce the covariance between rural/urban status and length of opposition control in my universe of cases. Second, I include additional cases to generate more data on opposition strategies and government crackdown to better situate the cases of Iringa and Kilimanjaro.




Figure 8: All subnational cases

I include Arusha City Council (CC) and Mbeya CC, two cities controlled by opposition parties since 2015, to gather more data on opposition strategies and understand how generalizable what I find in Iringa and Kilimanjaro are. Both places have been subject to crackdowns similar to that in Iringa. Arusha is a city in the Northeast of the country. Mbeya is a city in the Southwest of the country. Demographically, they are similar to Moshi and Iringa respectively but larger in size and with city status. In these areas, I only spoke to opposition politicians.

I also include some supplementary evidence from opposition rural areas, especially those with a longer history

of opposition support. Most of my primary cases are opposition and urban or recently won opposition rural areas. Given this, I also include evidence Rombo DC and Hai DC in Kilimanjaro and Babati DC in Mara. The latter of these two have a history of opposition control before 2010. Again, I only spoke to opposition politicians in these areas.

Finally, I include Same DC and Mwanga DC in southern Kilimanjaro. In these areas, I spoke with politicians from CCM and Chadema as well as voters. These are areas with uninterrupted histories of incumbent support but with growing support for opposition parties. I use these cases to explore what opposition control looks like in peri-urban and rural areas beyond my main cases.²⁶

6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I provide background to my case, Tanzania. For much of its history, Tanzania has been an archetypal case of stable electoral autocracy. Scholars attribute this stability to the CCM's hegemony over state resources and the central state, which has allowed it to reach deep into society and the economy (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Morse, 2018).

The CCM's dominance is waning. In 2015, opposition parties won parties threatened to unseat the ruling party. Chadema's strong showing in that election means that an opposition party now commands extensive local state capacity. In the three chapters which follow, I argue that strong opposition support in 2015 is the result of loss of local control in previous elections. I demonstrate that this tempered the CCM's reach and limited the extent to which they could contain the emergent threat from Chadema. Loss of local control took distributive and coercive powers from the CCM and handed them to their competition, who then used them to win and keep votes.

In the penultimate empirical chapter of this project, I argue that the rise in violence in contemporary Tanzania I describe here is a result of loss of local control. An increasingly desperate CCM now relies on violence to contain the threat from opposition parties. However, using evidence from my subnational case studies, I show that it is difficult to put the 'genie back in the bottle' in the final chapter. The CCM's use of repression against opposition parties may in fact alienate mass support for the regime in the long-run as I show in the case of Iringa. Thus, I argue that opposition control is dangerous for the CCM. Either they tolerate it and allow the emergence of a credible opposition party which may unseat them in an election or they repress and ultimately undermine the mass support that holds the regime together in the long-run.

Tanzania as a case is useful for a number of reasons, which I outlined in this chapter. Most important among these reasons is that it is a case where existing theories can explain the regime's long-standing stability but

²⁶I intended to include another municipal case study in this dissertation. This case study was going to focus on Morogoro MC and the surrounding rural area. Morogoro is a competitive area that the CCM retained local control of in 2015 but not by a large margin. Unfortunately, the deterioration of the security situation has prevented me from completing this fieldwork.

where existing theories fail to account for its decline. I contend that this is because scholars of authoritarian politics often overlook the local level. This means they overlook subnational constraints on incumbents' ability to use the local state to win votes and the ways opposition parties can turn the local state against them and hence undermine the stability of the CCM regime. Compared to other electoral autocracies and hegemonic party regimes, the local state is relatively weak vis-a-vis the center in Tanzania. Thus, if I can show that local control accounts for these shifts in the balance of power in Tanzania, this suggests that local control is likely to be important to regime durability in decentralized autocracies more broadly.